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Legal Certainty: A Common Law View and a Critique 
 
 
JOHN LINARELLI* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most fundamental principles of English contract and commercial law is that 
the law needs to be ‘certain’. The principle of certainty is widely accepted as an 
important working concept, even a standard of legitimacy, in active operation in English 
private law and indeed in English law more generally. If one were to peruse any 
standard treatise on the English law of Contract for example, one will find use of the 
concept to support legal doctrines and case outcomes.1 In October 2011, Lord Mance, a 
Justice on the UK Supreme Court, gave the Oxford Shrieval Lecture on ‘Should the 
Law be Certain?’ 2  Going back to the founding generation of modern English 
commercial law, Lord Mansfield’s pronouncement in Vallejo v Wheeler can be found in 
leading contemporary texts on English contract and commercial law: ‘in all mercantile 
transactions the great object should be certainty. And therefore, it is of more 
consequence that a rule should be certain than whether the rule is established one way 
or the other: because speculators in trade then know which ground to go upon’.3 In the 
2007 House of Lords judgment of Golden Straight Corporation v Nippon YKK, Lord 
Bingham asserted in his dissenting speech that ‘the quality of certainty’ is ‘a traditional 
strength and major selling point of English commercial law’.4 
Yet, in contrast, one would be hard pressed to find any such emphasis or 
pronouncements by American lawyers or judges. Hardly do we hear the word ‘certainty’ 
uttered in an American law school classroom or in an American courtroom. There are, 
of course, institutional differences in the structure of court systems in the two countries 
                                                 
 
 
* Professor of Commercial Law, Durham University Law School. 
1 Treitel’s classic text refers to ‘certainty’ 75 times, E Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contracts, 14th edn 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015). 
2 Lord Mance concluded that certainty is desirable but ‘not the ultimate aim of the law’. He was referring 
generally to the role of judges in a society. Lord Mance, ‘Should the law be certain?’ The Oxford Shrieval 
Lecture given at the University Church of St. Marcy the Virgin, Oxford, on 11 October  2011. 
3 Vallejo v Wheeler (1774) 1 Cowp 143, 153. 
4 (The “Golden Victory”) Golden Straight Corporation v Nippon YKK [2007] UKHL 12 para 1. I refer 
throughout this chapter to “English law”, which in the United Kingdom is the law of the jurisdiction of 
England and Wales. 
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that lead American Supreme Court justices to give lectures on federalism and public law 
issues.5 Private law is generally state and not federal law. But should not legal certainty 
be as important to American private and commercial lawyers as it is to their English 
counterparts?  
What is going on here? The aim of this chapter is to aid us in getting clear on the 
meaning of the concept of certainty in the common law tradition and the role of the 
concept in that tradition. To strive for clarity, we need to explore some relatively recent 
intellectual history about how the common law tradition diverged in approach between 
England and the United States in the twentieth century. Section I provides that 
intellectual history. It outlines in brief the split in the common law tradition that 
occurred in the early twentieth century between English conceptualists and American 
legal realists. The result is a now a demarcation between two sub-traditions within the 
common law tradition itself, one English and the other American. At the centre of this 
divergence was a dispute about the meaning of legal certainty. Section II goes over how 
the more contemporary and tractable concept is predictability, but the divergence in 
traditions has resulted in two different versions of predictability, one conceptual and 
about the logical form of legal rules and the other instrumental, about the move of legal 
rules towards meeting standards of economic efficiency. English and American lawyers 
appear to agree that the law should be predictable, though they may give predictability a 
different meaning depending on the context.  
 
 
CONCEPTUALISM VERSUS REALISM 
 
In their influential Introduction to Comparative Law, Konrad Zwiegert and Hein Kötz 
classify legal systems around the notion of legal families. Comparativists are well-
familiar with their classifications of ‘Romanistic,’ ‘Germanic,’ and ‘Anglo-American’ 
legal families, among others. While Zwiegert and Kötz classify civilian traditions in 
separate families, they classify all common law traditions within a single legal family, 
though they acknowledge that ‘though England is unquestionably the parent system, the 
law of the United States, while staying in the family’ it has developed a ‘distinctive  
style’.6 Others go further and classify the differences between American and English 
                                                 
 
 
5 See Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S. 64. 
6 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 1998) 41. 
3 
 
 
law as more fundamental. 7  Still others question these distinctions and whether the 
United States really is a set of mixed jurisdictions.8 These issues are beyond our scope 
here and I will stipulate for purposes of getting the argument out that American law is 
broadly within the common law tradition with some exceptions. It is certainly true that 
lawyers and judges in the early American Republic saw as one of their roles to adapt 
English common law to American conditions and that ancestral imprint still likely 
remains on American law. Because of differing political, economic, social, and 
geographical conditions between the two countries, differences have always existed 
since the very beginning of the American Republic and even before during the colonial 
period.  
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American law and legal thought diverged 
from English law but still was a net borrower of ideas and legislative innovations from 
Britain. The first wave of commercial legislation in the United States borrowing 
substantially from British legislation.9 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the United States was in its ‘classical’ stage of legal thought, which emphasised formal 
and conceptual reasoning about positive sources of law and supported a wholly 
individualist approach to the organisation of society.10 The individualistic ethics that law 
was supposed to represent in its rules has been overlooked; it can be seen as the forming 
the most important pillar of support for any legal system grounded in formal and 
conceptual reasoning. It is reflected in law when the law’s focus is primarily on the 
rights and duties of individual actors. For example, classical legal thought supported a 
tort law whose purpose was only to correct injustice in a binary relationship between 
tortfeasor and victim. It could not support a tort law serving social ends beyond 
corrective justice, such as in getting right the distribution of the risk of accidents. So too, 
contract and commercial law would focus on the will of the parties and so certainty in 
the law of market transacting would serve the needs of individuals to engage in 
voluntary exchange, however these concepts might be understood at the time. In such a 
society, certainty in the law takes on great importance because society has no real aims 
other than to support the individual in whatever they choose to do in market transactions. 
                                                 
 
 
7 See PS Atiyah and Robert S Summer, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative 
Study in Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions, new edn (Oxford University Press, 
1991). 
8 See N Garoupa and CI Gómez Ligüerre, ‘The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency’, (2012) 
40 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 307.  
9 See, eg, S Williston, ‘The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code’, (1950) 64 Harvard 
Law Review 561; KN Llewellyn, ‘Why a Commercial Code?’, (1951) 22 Tennessee Law Review 779. 
10 A definitive source on this period is WM Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought (Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
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If we conceive of private law in these bilateral and individualist ways, then certainty of 
course will have an important rank in the order of values a legal system purports to 
serve. Conceptualism offers a very important framework for thinking about the law in 
such a legal system.  
Conceptualism, in the sense used here, refers to a way of thinking about the law that 
places primary importance on the logical features of legal rules. 11  A lawyer uses 
conceptual analysis to get clear on the meaning of legal concepts and to search for 
logical coherence among legal concepts. The idea is that we should strive to understand 
the meaning of, say, legal obligation, right, duty, justice, and so on as those concepts are 
used by lawyers and judges. A conceptualist understanding of the law relies on a 
presupposition that law is, in Richard Posner’s words, an ‘autonomous discipline’.12  
Differences in how to think about the law as between the United States and England 
became apparent starting in the early twentieth century, leading to modes of legal 
thought in the United States focusing more on the social ends of law and in trying to 
understand the effects of law in society. While such a move has made inroads in the 
United Kingdom generally sometime later in the twentieth century, conceptualists still 
have relatively greater influence in English private and commercial law. For example, 
legal scholarship in commercial and corporate law in the United States is substantially 
in the law and economics school of thought but less so in the United Kingdom. How did 
this happen? The answer partly (but clearly not wholly) lies in understanding 
jurisprudential movements in the two countries from the late nineteenth century until the 
early 1960s. The brief excursion into intellectual history to follow is disputed by some13 
but it likely represents the ‘mainstream’ view. 
In the United States, sociological jurisprudence and then American legal realism 
brought an end to conceptualism as the most influential way of understanding the law. 
We can begin to comprehend the divergence in legal thought in the common law 
tradition by starting with Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s lecture for the dedication of a new 
law building at Boston University, ‘The Path of the Law’, published in the Harvard Law 
                                                 
 
 
11 See J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, new edn (Oxford University Press, 1999) 10. 
12 RA Posner, ‘The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987’, (1987) 100 Harvard Law 
Review 761. 
13 This is not the place to investigate competing interpretations but it may but it may be well worth 
reading BZ Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2010) and perhaps also investigating some of the recent literature on historical jurisprudence. See DM 
Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal Thought and the Transatlantic Turn to History (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); KM Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790-1900: 
Legal Thought Before Modernism (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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Review in 1897.14 Thomas Grey describes Holmes as ‘[t]he greatest oracle of American 
legal thought’.15 Sanford Levinson describes ‘The Path of the Law’ as ‘the single most 
important essay ever written by an American on the law’.16 Morton Horwitz argues that 
in ‘The Path of the Law’ Holmes ‘pushed American legal thought into the twentieth 
century’.17 Richard Posner argues that it ‘may be the best article-length work on law 
ever written’.18 
In ‘The Path of the Law’, Holmes offered his clearest criticism of the ‘fallacy . . . that 
the only force at work in the development of the law is logic’.19 In ‘The Path of the 
Law’, he offered a direct attack on certainty:  
 
[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for 
repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, 
and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a 
judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative 
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet 
the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.20 
 
In his dissenting opinion in the famous case of Lochner v New York, Holmes stated his 
famous aphorism that ‘[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases’.21 Legal 
rules will only take us so far. They will ‘run out’ and other more policy-oriented 
considerations will have to be deployed to solve the particular ‘legal’ problem at hand.  
We must combine Holmes’ criticism of the notion of legal certainty with his support 
for a prediction theory of law. Holmes thought certainty impractical but prediction to be 
central to the role of law. Holmes offered what is widely considered to be a precursor 
account to contemporary law and economics.22 Holmes argued: ‘a legal duty so called is 
                                                 
 
 
14 OW Holmes Jr., ‘The Path of the Law’, (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457. 
15 TC Grey, ‘Holmes and Legal Pragmatism’, (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 787. 
16  S Levinson, ‘Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward Critical Legal Studies?: The 
Jurisprudence of Richard Posner’, (1991) 91 Columbia Law Review 1221.  
17 M Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, new edn 
(Oxford University Press, 1994) 142. 
18 RA Posner, ‘Introduction’ in RA Posner (ed), The Essential Holmes (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1990) x. I do not want to paint too rosy a picture of Holmes. I rely on him here for the limited 
purpose of elucidating how the concept of certainty has worked its way into legal thought. For 
thoroughgoing critiques of Holmes, see SJ Burton (ed), The Path of the Law and its Influence: The 
Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
19 Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ 465. 
20 Ibid 466. 
21 Lochner v New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45, 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
22  Many have so asserted. See G Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at 
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nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to 
suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; and so, of a legal right’.23 His 
famous ‘bad man’ quote is worth repeating here:  
 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad 
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge 
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, 
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of 
conscience.24 
  
He continues: ‘But if we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he 
does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know 
what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. 
The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are 
what I mean by the law’.25 In the prediction theory set forth in ‘The Path of the Law’ we 
find the origins of the efficient breach doctrine in the economics of contract law: ‘The 
duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if 
you do not keep it, - and nothing else.’26  
We need to combine Holmes’ argument for law as serving the role of prediction with 
his argument that inquiry about law must move towards a focus on social ends, using 
the tools of the social sciences. Holmes said in ‘The Path of the Law’: ‘For the rational 
study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the 
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics. It is revolting to have no 
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.’27 
Holmes’s approach is a forerunner to American legal realism. Let us now move 
forward in time to the apex of the legal realist movement in the United States. Karl 
Llewellyn was the principal architect of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United 
States and the Code is widely seen as the most important achievement of the legal 
realists. Llewellyn was commercial lawyer and the most influential figure in the first 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
Century’s End (New York, New York University Press, 1995) 86. 
23 Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ 458 
24 Ibid 459. 
25 Ibid 460-1. 
26 Ibid 462. 
27 Ibid 469. Beyond our scope here is an investigation of how the economics of Holmes’ day differed 
from contemporary economics. See H Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law: Neoclassical Legal 
Thought 1870-1970 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015) 75-90. 
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school of jurisprudence (broadly understood) indigenous to the United States. The Code 
drafters, led by Llewellyn, seem to have agreed with Llewellyn’s view that uniformity 
of language was no guarantee of uniformity of interpretation. Rather, what was needed 
were clear statements of reason and purpose in the Code, which would prompt courts to 
justify decisions according to these statements of reason and purpose.28 This approach to 
drafting the Code led to disquiet among practicing lawyers, who were accustomed to 
placing the integrity of a commercial statute on the notion of certainty. Llewellyn was 
aware of this worry and turned the argument on its head in his promotion of the newly 
drafted Code by arguing that it improved the certainty of the law: 
 
It costs the business man first because of the uncertainty. There are fields in 
which no man, before the case has been brought up to the supreme court of 
the particular state in the particular instance, has any assurance as to what 
the law is. There are fields, therefore, in which the counselor is without a 
sound foundation for effective counseling.29 
 
The historical evidence suggests, however, that Llewellyn may have held a different and 
much more nuanced view of the role of certainty than what he offered during the 
drafting stages for the Uniform Commercial Code. We of course do not know his 
motives when he was deep in the process of drafting the Code and he may have been 
assuaging the fears of the bar to promote the success of the Code, or he may have 
simply changed his views at various stages in his professional life. His writings both 
before and after the Code project tell us something different about his views on the role 
of certainty in the law, and perhaps are closer to his true convictions, though we will 
never know.  
Llewellyn’s work early in his career, Präjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in 
Amerika, published in German in 1933 and not translated into English until 1989, offers 
perhaps his most sophisticated insights on legal certainty.30 This book, in English, The 
Case Law System in America, was written for a series of lectures that Llewellyn gave at 
the University of Leipzig Faculty of Law. It can be difficult to segregate legal certainty 
as a notion from other arguments the legal realists made about law and legal 
                                                 
 
 
28 See ZB Wiseman, ‘The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules’, (1987) 100 Harvard 
Law Review 465, 495. 
29 Llewellyn, Llewellyn, ‘Why a Commercial Code?’ 779-80.  
30  KN Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989) 
(translated by M Ansaldi; edited and with an introduction by P Gewirtz).  
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interpretation because a good deal of what they said was an attack on legal 
conceptualism more generally, which places great value on certainty. Llewellyn’s 
German scholarship reflects a set of themes that he pursued more generally in his work. 
At least three claims come out of that work, two of which relate indirectly to legal 
certainty and one of which is directly about legal certainty. First, Llewellyn argued that 
the methods of judges and lawyers, which he characterised as the lawyer’s craft and 
‘feel,’ are significant sources of certainty about the law. Second, the ‘situation sense’ of 
cases and not the legal rules are what lead to the predictability of judicial decisions. In 
other words, a judge’s ‘sense of justice’ is normatively relevant. Third, while legal 
certainty refers to predictability of judicial decision making for the lawyer, for the 
layperson it means consistency of legal rules with social norms. It is this layperson 
sense of certainty that will make him write an Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, on the sale of goods that places great importance on merchant custom.31  
Llewellyn’s later work dealt with what William Twining has described as the myth of 
uncertainty, which was really a way to say that the concept of certainty was unhelpful in 
understanding the quality of law.32 In his book, The Common Law Tradition, published 
in 1960, Llewellyn took the following position on legal certainty:  
 
I reject as useless and misleading the dichotomy which infected so much 
writing of the ‘20s and ‘30s: absolute or 100 per cent certainty versus 
anything else at all as being ‘uncertainty.’ I see no absolute certainty of 
outcome in any aspect of legal life, and think that no man should ever have 
imagined that any such thing could be, or could be worth serious 
consideration. Instead I see degrees of lessening certainty of outcome 
ranging from what to the observer or participant seems pure chance, into a 
situation where a skilled, experienced guess (though only a guess) is yet a 
better bet than the guess of the ignorant, through a situation where the odds 
run plainly a little one way, through one where skilled counsel can be 
expected to materially increase the odds, and on through the situation which 
is a business gamble or better into the one which is for human living 
‘safe.’33  
 
                                                 
 
 
31 Wiseman, ‘The Limits of Vision’. 
32 See W Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) 207. 
33 KN Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston, Little Brown, 1960) 17  
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And also in The Common Law Tradition: 
 
[T]he ideal is not ‘certainty’ at all, in any way of the senses in which that 
term is commonly applied to matters legal. The true ideal is reasonable 
regularity of decision. If there is regularity, there is continuity enough…. 
The reasonable aspect of the regularity . . . holds out full room to adjust any 
complex of tension to the hugely variant needs of whatever the relevant 
type-situations may be…. 34 
 
Llewellyn connected these claims to the idea of ‘reasonable reckonability’ in appellate 
judging. For Llewellyn, reasonable reckonability rather than certainty was the 
appropriate focus, which connects to his idea of law as a craft and with judges sharing 
deeply ingrained professional habits of thought, beliefs, and attitudes. He catalogued 
fourteen ‘steadying factors’ at work in litigation that underwrite what could be expected 
from judicial decision making.35 Reasonable reckonability shares substantial similarities 
with the notion of legitimate expectations that one finds in English and European public 
law.36 
Llewellyn was not in the ‘radical’ wing of legal realism and his approach to critiquing 
the concept of certainty was to substitute what he considered to be more useful concepts 
that more closely connected to being able to evaluate the behaviour and action of judges 
for those limited to elucidating the logical form of the law. The radical wing of legal 
realism was more critical and less reconstructive. Jerome Frank, for example, argued 
that there was a value to legal uncertainty, in that a person has a ‘positive delight’ for the 
‘hazardous, incalculable character of life’ and sees ‘life’s very insecurity’ as offering its 
‘most inviting aspect’.37 One must wonder whether Frank’s attempt at a psychology of 
judging was more fanciful than serious.38 Still, regardless of which wing of legal realism 
we examine, taking the influence of legal realism as a whole on American legal thought, 
along with some of its successor movements such as Critical Legal Studies, we can say 
                                                 
 
 
34 Ibid 216 (footnotes omitted). 
35 Ibid 19-61. 
36 P Craig, ‘Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectations’ in P Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) ch 18. 
37 LL Fuller, ‘American Legal Realism’, (1934) 82 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 429, 433. J 
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Paris, Brentano 1930) 17. Frank dedicated significant parts of his book 
to the 'myth of certainty’. J Paul, ‘Jerome Frank’s Attack on the ‘Myth’ of Legal Certainty’, (1957) 36 
Nebraska Law Review 547. 
38 See Roscoe Pound’s critique. R Pound, The Ideal Element in Law (Calcutta, University of Calcutta 
Press, 1958).  
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with some confidence that the concept of legal certainty has received less emphasis in 
American legal education and in American law more generally after the rise and fall of 
the legal realists. 
Llewellyn’s approach to certainty did seem to prevail on the drafting style of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Homer Kripke, a key member of the drafting team of the 
original Code and a practitioner, summarises the tensions between the academics and 
the practitioners about legal certainty in Code drafting as follows: 
 
The extent to which the draftsmen left commercial law without rules 
operating with certainty made some of the practicing members of the 
sponsor organizations very unhappy. Here again, the draftsmen's academic 
orientation was apparent. They could view with more equanimity than the 
practicing lawyers the fact that a question of commercial reasonableness or 
good faith is uncertain and unpredictable, a question of fact, i.e., a jury 
question, an invitation to litigation. Where the practitioners wanted 
problems answered in the statute, the draftsmen were content to leave the 
answers to the judicial process. The draftsmen pointed out that the fear of 
jury decisions applies only to the man who practices brinkmanship in his 
application of the nonautomatic standards. One who keeps himself well 
within commercial standards, or who acts in unquestionable good faith, has 
no problem. This was scant comfort to the practicing lawyers who 
envisioned specific close problems. 
The academicians rightly prevailed. In these days of airway bills and 
forwarders' receipts, of computers, of magnetic tapes and magnetic inks, of 
communication satellites, the only rule that will not become obsolete is the 
rule that automatically adjusts to change. In the long run, the Code's efforts 
to restore the vitality of the law merchant will prove to have been well 
conceived.’39  
 
Much later, these views about trade-offs between flexibility or adaptability and certainty 
will be challenged 40  but the challenge has probably not stuck and still the basic 
                                                 
 
 
39  H Kripke, ‘The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code’, (1962) 
University of Illinois Law Forum 321 (footnotes omitted). 
40 A Schwartz and RE Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’, (2003) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 541; D Charny, ‘The New Formalism in Contract’, (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 
842; RA Hillman, ‘The ‘New Conservatism’ in Contract Law and the Process of Legal Change’, (1999) 
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characteristics associated with the decline of conceptualism in the United States 
continues to be influential in law and legal thought in that country. 
From Holmes onward we can see a clear trend in American legal thought away from 
the conceptualism of certainty and towards an instrumental form of predictability about 
the law. American legal realism left its imprint on American commercial law, and 
American law more generally, even as the legal realist movement receded into history. 
The school of American legal thought that attempted a middle ground between 
conceptualism and realism – the legal process school – did nothing to bring back the 
notion of certainty to prominence. In fact, it perpetuated the decline of the concept in 
American legal thought with its focus on statutory interpretation that relies on statutory 
purpose rather than a literal interpretation of the language of statutes and its allowance 
for moral principles and social aims to inform the law.41 The familiar refrain in the 
American legal academy has been that ‘we are all legal realists now,’ which we should 
not interpret literally but as a way of saying that legal realism has left its influence on 
American law.42 That refrain will be less heard as legal realism becomes recedes to a 
more distant history for succeeding generations but to the extent that the history of ideas 
matters the influence of legal realism will persist.  
While conceptual analysis still remains important in American law, as it does more or 
less in any legal system, there is far more of what Joseph Singer calls ‘line drawing’ in 
the United States than in the search for certain answers grounded in the immanence and 
internal logic of immutable and abstract legal concepts.43 A lawyer engaged in line 
drawing must necessarily think of law as an attempt at balancing competing sets of 
interests along the broader lines of the policies and purposes underlying legal rules, in 
search of how law might achieve social ends such as those associated with efficiency or 
fairness. In such an approach, certainty will necessarily have less importance. More 
generally, the trend of legal thought in the United States moved in the early to mid-
twentieth century towards placing high importance on understanding the social ends of 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
40 Boston College Law Review 879; RJ Mooney, ‘The New Conceptualism in Contract Law’, (1995) 74 
Oregon Law Review 1131.  
41 The canonical text in the Legal Process School is HM Hart and AM Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic 
Problems in the Making and Application of Law, initially published in mimeo form for use by students 
but in current form is a casebook published by Foundation Press, and edited by WN Eskridge Jr. and PP 
Frickey. The latest edition is as of 2006.  
42 See J Singer, ‘Legal Realism Now’, (1988) 76 California Law Review 465.  
Legal realism has fundamentally altered our conceptions of legal reasoning and of the relationship 
between law and society. The legal realists were remarkably successful both in changing the terms of 
legal discourse and in undermining the idea of a self-regulating market system. All major current schools 
of thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism. To some extent, we are all realists now. 
43 Ibid. 
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law and began to place a lower-order emphasis on the logical features of the law and 
legal concepts. Doing so-called ‘doctrinal’ analysis has never lost its significance in the 
United States, but it is just not considered all that high-powered any more as a tool for 
the development of the law.  
In the early to mid-twentieth century, legal thought in England, and Britain more 
generally, took a different course. The period in the history of legal thought when 
Holmes wrote the ‘Path of the Law’ in 1897 and in which the legal realists were 
ascendant in America, from about 1930 to 1955, compare approximately to the period 
from when John Austin resigned as Professor of Jurisprudence from University College 
London in 1834 to when H.L.A. Hart began his appointment as Professor of 
Jurisprudence at Oxford in 1952. Of course, legal thought then was not monolithic and 
even the realists had influential critics in America.44 I can only suggest general trends.45 
There will be counterexamples. I offer a brief sketch of intellectual history here to show 
that there has indeed been a divergence in the common law tradition in ways to 
approach the legal certainty, that this divergence connects more basically to differing 
ways of thinking about the law generally, and that the divergence remains influential to 
this day, though, as I explain below, both the English and the American traditions within 
the common law world have retrenched somewhat in the contemporary period from 
more extreme positions when legal realism was ascendant. 
When the history of legal thought is explored, rarely is anything said about the period 
between Austin and Hart, expect perhaps about Maine’s historical jurisprudence, which 
seems to have had little lasting influence.46 Neil Duxbury offers a critique: ‘It would be 
wrong to assume that nothing happened in English jurisprudence between Austin’s era 
and Hart’s. It is just that nothing much happened that would be remembered’ and ‘[i]t 
seems fair to say . . . that English jurisprudence after Austin lacked imagination and 
direction’.47 
English ‘jurisprudes’ of the day did not write jurisprudence as we know it today, 
though neither did the legal realists.48 We can narrow our scope of discussion to a 
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grouping of legal scholars on both sides of the Atlantic who asked questions about the 
law generally and about the preferred methods for inquiring about law, and who pitted 
themselves against each other in ways that have affected the way that legal certainty is 
understood in the common law tradition today. 
Says Duxbury, ‘Americans who travel the neglected path that is English 
jurisprudence from the 1830s to the 1950s will soon find themselves in a world very 
different from their own. . . .’49 English jurisprudence focused on the analysis of legal 
concepts in this period.50 Duxbury explains that the English legal scholars of the day 
that are the focus of our discussion wrote ‘essays about stare decisis, the relationship 
between law and equity, statutory interpretation, the English court system, the growth of 
negligence liability, the divisions between the various branches of the law, and other 
basic legal themes’. 51  The influence of focusing on the analysis of legal concepts 
remains a stronger influence in England (and Britain more generally) than in the United 
States. Hart’s analytical jurisprudence did nothing to dispel it and indeed could be said 
to have promoted the analysis of legal concepts. The analysis of concepts of course 
occurred in the United States, where its most influential proponent of the time under 
investigation was probably Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.52 But Hohfeld’s work was not as 
influential as legal realism (which followed later) or even Pound’s sociological 
jurisprudence. 
One of the more influential figures of the time in Britain was Arthur Goodhart, who 
held the Chair in Jurisprudence that Hart would eventually hold for twenty years before 
Hart, from 1932-52. 53  Though Goodhart was careful to balance competing 
considerations in his inaugural lecture in 1932,54 Harold Laski, who chaired the lecture, 
wrote to Holmes that Goodhart ‘thought clearly, that the realists . . . were just wicked’.55 
Goodhart argued that the common law doctrine of precedent gives the common law its 
certainty and that ‘when a precedent is created the law becomes rigid’.56 In a stunning 
display of ignorance or naivete (or a combination of the two) of civilian legal methods, 
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56 AL Goodhart, ‘Precedent in English and Continental Law’, (1934) 50 Law Quarterly Review 40, 64, 
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Goodhart argued in his inaugural lecture that ‘[i]t is in its claim to certainty and rigidity 
that the English method has a marked advantage over the Continental one. . . .’57 
Goodhart was also critical of the legal realist focus on uncertainty in the law. He argued 
that ‘the most striking feature of this school is the stress they place upon the uncertainty 
of law’.58 This emphasis, said Goodhart, ‘may lead to juristic pessimism on the part of 
students, and, what is even more dangerous, that it will induce an emotional rather than 
rational approach to legal problems’.59 His criticism of Frank in his inaugural lecture 
was tautological, relying on an odd analogy to military orders to make the point that ‘[i]t 
is of course possible to point to exceptional cases, but we do know that in practice 
English Courts recognize that they are bound by precedents, and that no attempt is made 
to escape from them if they are clearly on point’.60 
CK Allen, Goodhart’s colleague at Oxford, described attempts to evaluate law using 
the social sciences as ‘Megalomaniac Jurisprudence.’61 Says Duxbury, he considered 
Pound’s sociological jurisprudence to be ‘inappropriately normative’ and that that ‘legal 
realism filled him with feelings approximating disgust’.62 Said Allen: ‘It was perhaps 
appropriate that the age of jazz should produce a Jazz Jurisprudence.’ 63  Others at 
Oxford and particularly at the London universities of the time were more receptive,64 
but remember there were few academic law schools at the time in Britain and 
scholarship from the medieval universities such as Oxford carried great weight, not only 
in England but in the British sphere of influence in what were to become the 
Commonwealth family of nations.  
One could suggest a number of related reasons for the divergence in the common law 
tradition between realists and conceptualists. Ultimately the explanation will depend on 
the discipline in which the person offering it operates. The most compelling is perhaps a 
sociological explanation.65 American legal realism may have been a response to social 
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and political events in the United States in the early twentieth century, in which classical 
legal thought was associated with a ‘laissez faire’ ideology of the United States Supreme 
Court of the time, which used its powers of judicial review to enforce freedom of 
contract doctrines that obstructed early attempts at regulating the economy and made 
difficult the implementation of New Deal policies.66 It may also have been an attempt to 
undue so-called Langdellian approaches to the study of law in American law schools, 
associated with classical legal thought.67 Add to all of this that federalism in a large 
country that was undergoing significant social change made it impossible to maintain 
consistency of case law across many jurisdictions and so American versions of the 
common law necessarily would lead to contradictions in the case law. The Supreme 
Court in Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins68 is widely understood to have settled the point 
that the common law resided in the states, and this lead eventually to the common law 
comprising essentially only private law in the United States. Duxbury concludes: ‘North 
American commentators were concluding by the 1960s that English jurisprudence and 
American jurisprudence were each motivated by different concerns, and that the English 
had but the flimsiest understanding of realist legal thought. It is difficult to argue that 
this conclusion is wrong.’69  
It is difficult to draw clear lines in this divergence of thought in the common law 
tradition. Legal realism was not a coherent body of thought and legal realists can be said 
to form different wings or variants.70 Many legal realists were ‘hard core’ lawyers and 
took legal doctrine seriously. Many American legal scholars and lawyers of the time 
were not legal realists and were avid critics of legal realism. The folklore around 
Llewellyn, for example, was that he had an encyclopaedic knowledge of sales law and a 
review of his challenging Sales Law casebook reveals it.71 Paradoxically, the study of 
law in the United States must necessarily be on the concepts of law and their logical 
form because there is really no way in a large and diverse federal system of many 
jurisdictions to study ‘the’ cases for many categories of law, except perhaps for 
American federal constitutional and administrative law.  
The debate about certainty between American and English lawyers transformed into 
the latter twentieth century into a discussion of the predictability of the law. 
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Predictability is the more sensible concept because it allows for the consideration of 
probabilities and to be able to say with something less than 100% accuracy what the law 
will be or a court will decide.  
If we were to take certainty at its word it would be difficult to find it except for very 
simple rules that specify simple concepts like durations of time. Lawyers in the common 
law tradition, English or American, broadly agree that predictability is important, but 
what predictability means to them depends at least to some extent on how the debate 
between the conceptualists and the realists played out as outlined above. It is to the 
divergent meanings of predictability in the common law tradition to which I now turn.  
 
 
CONCEPTUAL VERSUS INSTRUMENTAL PREDICTABILITY 
 
In his 1988 Memorial Lecture at Monash University, the preeminent English 
commercial law scholar Sir Roy Goode outlined eight principles for a ‘philosophy and 
concepts of commercial law’. 72  The second principle after party autonomy is 
predictability. Nowhere does Goode identify certainty as a principle. In a footnote to his 
discussion of predictability, Goode asserts that predictability is ‘also termed ‘certainty’, 
a term I dislike as nothing in life is certain except uncertainty, and this is particularly 
true of litigation’.73 Goode continues: ‘A reasonable degree of predictability is needed in 
the commercial world because so much planning and so many transactions, standardised 
or high in value, are undertaken on the basis that the courts will continue to follow the 
rules laid down in preceding cases.’74 
We can term Goode’s idea of predictability as conceptual predictability. It is 
predictability about the text of the law itself, a matter of whether the law can be used to 
plan transactions or other human activity. Conceptual predictability is predictability in 
the form of the law, grounded in the law’s logical features and the features of the 
language of the law in offering guidance to business planners and legal professionals. 
Conceptual predictability is a value sought in both the English and the American 
versions of the common law. Legal realism did not change this basic feature about 
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American law. For example, the American Revised Uniform Partnership Act, a uniform 
model law that the Uniform Law Commission in the United States has produced for 
consideration by state legislatures, contains Section 404, designed to clarify on what 
precisely are the fiduciary duties of partners to each other.75 Section 404(a) specifies 
that ‘[t]he only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners 
are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care’ as specified in subsections (b) and (c).76 
Subsection (b) states that a partner’s duty of loyalty ‘is limited to’ a discrete list of 
duties.77  Subsection (c) does the same for the duty of care. 78  Other subsections of 
section 404 provide that while partners owe each other a duty of good faith, ‘[a] partner 
does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement 
merely because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own interest’ and ‘[a] partner 
may lend money to and transact other business with the partnership, and as to each loan 
or transaction, the rights and obligations of the partners are the same as those of a 
person who is not a partner, subject to other applicable law’. 79  These concrete 
provisions were meant to clarify open textured statements in the case law on the 
fiduciary duties of partners. Other examples of conceptual predictability in action are 
the many ‘safe harbor’ provisions found in American securities regulation and other 
fields, including in some areas of EU law. 80  Though the law will differ in some 
substantial respects, similar techniques are at work in English law.  
There is another version of predictability at work, probably more in American law 
than in English law. I shall call this version of predictability instrumental predictability. 
The idea of instrumental predictability is this: the law is predictable or ‘certain’ to the 
extent that it conforms reliably to some criterion independent of or external to the 
coherence of the legal rules themselves as legal rules. We can develop two versions of 
instrumental predictability. One is the positive version that the law in fact tends to 
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comply with the designated external normative criterion. The other is the normative 
version that the law ought to comply with the designated criterion. The idea here is not 
to construct legal concepts that reliably produce predictable consequences in a logical or 
formal sense, but that if we use an external criterion as a guide for making and 
interpreting legal rules, then predictability will result from the use of this criterion in 
developing the content of legal rules around it. 
In the American context, the most prominent external criterion, at least for 
commercial and private law, is economic efficiency. 81  So, the positive version of 
instrumental predictability is that the law does comply with the dictates of economic 
efficiency, a claim made in the very early law and economics literature about the 
efficiency of the common law.82 The normative version of instrumental predictability is 
that legal doctrines that fail to comply with standards of economic efficiency should be 
made to comply, either through evolution of case law or through legislation, though of 
course any such efforts should be examined with the tools of public choice theory or 
political economy.83 The positive version may be true or false. The normative version 
offers a set of prescriptions to promote a form of predictability in the law centred around 
the substance of the law but not its form.  
Instrumental predictability may not be in the minds of lawyers when they read cases 
or interpret statutes. It is unlikely to be something that practicing lawyers and judges 
actually reflect on when engaging with the law. With its connections to the social 
science of economics, it is a theoretical notion independent of what lawyers actually do. 
It is a theory about how people behave, reducible to economics. An analogy would be 
that Hank Aaron did not have to know about the physics of hitting a baseball to hit 
home runs in American baseball. In its positive form, it is a prediction about the law’s 
direction. It is more likely that legal academics take an active approach to implementing 
instrumental predictability when they critically examine the law and critique it to 
determine whether it is efficient and argue that it should meet efficiency standards. 
While it is difficult to generalise about the path of legal though, it is likely true that such 
activity by American legal academics is accepted at least partly because their 
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intellectual ancestors, the American legal realists, were among the first legal thinkers to 
approach law from social science perspectives. To the extent that the idea of 
instrumental predictability has traction with American legal academics, either 
consciously or not, it will have crept into American legal scholarship and ultimately into 
ways of understanding the law from an American point of view more generally.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Legal certainty remains one of the more important concepts about the law, yet there has 
been little serious reflection about it. Its presence tends to be taken for granted in mature 
legal systems. This chapter has traced the origins of the concept in the common law 
tradition from its eighteenth century pronouncements by Lord Mansfield on the King’s 
Bench in England to the present day. Along the way, I have tried to show that there are 
actually two somewhat divergent traditions within the common law tradition itself, 
which came to a sharp point of departure in the early twentieth century in the 
differences in approaches to the law as evidenced by English conceptualist and 
American legal realist traditions. In that divergence, the concept of certainty changed in 
the common law tradition. English Lawyers and judges still articulate the concept to 
evaluate the merits of English commercial law. American lawyers and judges do so far 
less, but the concept of certainty is still important in American law. In both traditions 
predictability is the more modern and tractable concept. I outlined two versions of 
predictability, a conceptual version that looks for predictability in the form and structure 
of the law itself, and instrumental predictability, which looks for predictability in the 
law’s compliance with economic efficiency. Conceptual predictability is important in 
both the American and the English versions of the common law, though it is more 
explicitly stressed in English law. Instrumental predictability is probably more 
important in American than in English law, though English law likely conforms no more 
or less to it than American law.  
 
